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Comment /Antitrust Civil Process Act:
An Unreasonable Search and Seizure?-
Petition of Gold Bond Stamp Company
PURSUANT TO THE Antitrust Civil Process Act,' the Attorney General is author-
ized to serve a civil investigative demand on any corporation, association,
partnership or other legal entity not a natural person,2 whenever he has reason
to believe that such party is in possession of any documentary material rele-
vant to a civil antitrust investigation. 3 The materials so obtained may be used
by the Attorney General in either civil or criminal prosecutions. 4 This legis-
lation is unprecedented in the annals of American legislative history. Al-
though many administrative agencies, vested with the authority to enforce
civil sanctions, have been granted subpoena power,5 never before has the At-
torney General, in his capacity as federal criminal prosecutor, been afforded
such power.
Shortly after the passage of the Act, a demand was served upon the Gold
Bond Stamp Company,6 a corporation involved in the consumer trading
stamp business. The Sherman Act, sections one, two, and three, 7 was specifi-
176 Stat. 548-552, 15 U.S.C. §§1311-14 (1962); for an analysis of the Act, see 51 Ky. L.J. 393
(1963); 111 U. PA. L. REv. 1021 (1963).
-15 U.S.C. §1311 (f).
a 15 U.S.C. §1312 (a). Privileged materials are not subject to the demand, 15 U.S.C.
§1312 (c) (2).
'15 U.S.C. §1312 (a).
Secretary of Agriculture, 7 U.S.C. §7a (2), §1373, §1603; Secretary of Labor, 5 U.S.C. §780;
Secretary of the Army, 33 U.S.C. §506; Secretary of the Treasury, 31 U.S.C. §548, 26 U.S.C.
§7602; Federal Trade Commission, 15 U.S.C. §49; Director, National Science Foundation, 42
U.S.C. §1872 (a) (f) (1); Administrator, Veterans Administration, 38 U.S.C. §3311.
0 Petition of Gold Bond Stamp Company, 221 F. Supp. 391 (D. Minn. 1963).
15 U.S.C. §§1, 2, 3. The demand served upon the petitioner stated as follows:
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cally mentioned in the demand as the basis for the inquiry. Violations under
the Sherman Act are punishable both civilly and criminally.8 Gold Bond
Stamp Company petitioned the District Court for an order modifying or set-
ting aside the demand. One of petitioner's contentions was that the power
granted to the Attorney General violates the search and seizure clause of the
Fourth Amendment to the Constitution. After denying the petition, the court
held inter alia that the Act did not violate petitioner's constitutional rights
under the Fourth Amendment.
This comment will be concerned with the question of whether the civil in-
vestigative demand authorized by the Act is an unreasonable search and
seizure.
SEARCH AND SEIZURE AND THE CORPORATION
Historically, the term unreasonable search and seizure has been associated
with general warrants," writs of assistance o or any type of warrant which is
formally defective or improperly executed. It may be difficult to conceive how
a demand for the production of documentary materials can amount to an un-
reasonable search and seizure. There is no physical invasion by unwelcome
officials, no rummaging of files and records. Nor is there any actual seizure of
records."
However, the courts have considered a demand for the production of docu-
mentary materials as a "constructive" search.' 2 The famous Boyd case' 8 was
the first case to propose the "constructive" search theory. That case involved
"This civil investigative demand is issued pursuant to the provisions of the Antitrust Civil
Process Act, 76 Stat. 548-552, Title 15 United States Code Secs. 1311-1314, in the course of an
inquiry for the purpose of ascertaining whether there is or has been a violation of the provi-
sions of Title 15 United States Code Secs. 1, 2, 3, 13, 14 and 18 by conduct of the following
nature: Restrictive practices and acquisitions involving the dispensing, supplying, sale or fur-
nishing of trading stamps and the purchase and sale of goods and services in connection there-
with," Petition of Gold Bond Stamp Company, supra note 6, at 397.
8 Criminal violators under the Sherman Act are guilty of a misdemeanor punishable by a
fine up to $5,000, and/or imprisonment up to one year. 15 U.S.C. §§1, 2, 3. In civil actions the
court may order the defendant to divest itself of some of its holdings, and/or forbid the con-
tinuance of the prohibited act. Standard Oil v. U.S., 221 U.S. 1, 78 (1911).
9 This was a warrant issued by the English State Secretary's Office ordering the arrest (with-
out naming any persons) of the author, printer, and publisher of seditious libels specified in
the warrant. Lord Camden in Entick v. Carrington, 2 Wils. K.B. 276 (1765) held that such
warrants were illegal.
10 These writs involved goods which had not been processed through customs authorities.
They authorized the person to whom they were issued to enter into any house where the
goods were suspected to be concealed. See Goldman v. U.S., 316 U.S. 129, 139 (1942), for the
better known accounts of writs of assistance.
u Handler, Constitutionality of Investigations of the Federal Trade Commission, 28 COLUM.
L. REV. 905, 909 (1928).
2Boyd v. U.S., 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886); Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 76 (1906); Interstate
Commerce Commission v. Brimson, 154 U.S. 447 (1894).
"Boyd v. U.S., supra note 12.
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a proceeding, instituted by the Government, against a partnership to forfeit a
shipment of plate glass imported in violation of the customs regulations. An
order was obtained under section 5 of the Act of 1874,14 compelling the de-
fendants to produce an invoice which would substantiate the charge. The
defendants complied with the order but at the trial objected to the introduc-
tion of the invoice in evidence. They based their objection on the ground that
the Act of 1874 violated the Fourth and Fifth Amendments. The Supreme
Court held that the reception of the invoice in evidence was erroneous and
reversed the lower court. The statute was declared unconstitutional, since it
violated both the Fourth and Fifth Amendments.
In answer to the Government's contention that an order for production of
records was not search and seizure within the Fourth Amendment, the Court
said:
.. Breaking into a house and opening boxes and drawers are circumstances of
aggravation; but any forcible and compulsory extortion of a man's own testimony
or of his private papers to be used as evidence to convict him of crime or forfeit
his goods is within the condemnation .... 15
The Court then concluded:
... that a compulsory production of the private books and papers of the owner of
goods sought to be forfeited ... is the equivalent of a search and seizure-and an
unreasonable search and seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. 16
Subsequent cases have uniformly held that a corporation is protected by the
guaranty of the Fourth Amendment against unreasonable search and seizure,
whether made pursuant to a criminal or a civil proceeding. 17 However, the
Supreme Court, in Wilson v. U.S.,' s limited this right where corporate books
and records were involved. This limitation is supported by the theory that a
corporation is a "creature of the state" and, as such, is subject to broad visi-
torial powers of the incorporating state. Its books and records may be exam-
ined by the incorporating state to determine whether or not the corporation
is complying with the laws of that state.19 The corporate records have been
14 This Act was entitled "An Act to amend the custom revenue laws, and to repeal moie-
ties." 18 Stat. 186 (1874).
Boyd v. U.S., supra note 12, at 630.
'-'Id. at 634-35.
1" Silverthorn Lumber Co. v. U.S. 251 U.S. 385 (1920); U.S. v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 633
(1950); Interstate Commerce Commission v. Brimson, supra note 12. However the courts have
consistently held the protections against self-incrimination of the Fifth Amendment inappli-
cable to corporations, Essgee Co. v. U.S., 262 U.S. 151 (1923); Hale v. Henkel, supra note 12;
Wilson v. U.S., 221 U.S. 561 (1911).
' Wilson v. U.S., supra note 17.
19This theory is best expressed by Brown, J. in Hale v. Henkel, supra note 12, at 74-75
where he states:
"... the corporation is a creature of the state. It is presumed to be incorporated for the
1964]
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considered public records. 20 The investigative power of Congress over corpo-
rations involved in interstate commerce has been held to be analogous to the
visitorial powers of the incorporating state.21
Those cases which follow the "creature of the state" theory contend that the
test for the "unreasonableness" of a demand is whether the materials de-
manded are relevant to the inquiry, and whether they can be fairly determined
by the party served.
22
It would appear that such a limitation on the privilege against unreason-
able search and seizure would be diametrically opposed to the holding in the
Boyd case. In the Wilson case, the court contended that the Boyd case involved
private papers, not public documents and was, therefore, distinguishable.
2 3
In Okla. Press Pub. Co. v. Walling,24 involving an administrative subpoena
issued while investigating a violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act, the
Court was less imaginative. It simply held that the Boyd case was limited to
criminal proceedings and proceedings for forfeiture of property.25 In U.S. v.
Morton Salt Co.,26 where the Court considered the issuance of subpoenas by
the Federal Trade Commission, the Court agreed with the Okla. Press Pub.
Co. case in distinguishing the Boyd case.27
Even though the original impetus of the Boyd case ruling has been greatly
reduced, it has never been overruled. Why has the Court permitted the Boyd
case to survive? Is it a mere derelict on the sea of law?
The Boyd case serves a very useful and necessary purpose in a day of wide-
spread governmental controls. It represents a caveat to those who would sacri-
fice private security for the public interest. The Court in the Okla. Press Pub.
Co. case readily admitted that "there has always been a real problem of balanc-
benefit of the public. It receives certain special privileges and franchises, and holds them sub-
ject to the laws of the state and the limitations of its charter. Its powers are limited by law.
It can make no contract not authorized by its charter. Its rights to act as a corporation are
only preserved to it so long as it obeys the laws of its creation. There is a reserved right in the
legislature to investigate its contracts and find out whether it has exceeded its powers. It
would be a strange anomaly to hold that a state, having chartered a corporation to make use
of certain franchises, could not, in the exercise of its sovereignty inquire how these franchises
had been employed, and whether they had been abused...." See also Wilson v. U.S. supra
note 17.
2D Ibid.
2Interstate Commerce Commission v. Baird, 194 U.S. 25 (1904); Interstate Commerce Com-
mission v. Brimson, supra note 12; Interstate Commerce Commission v. Goodrich Transit Co.,
224 U.S. 194 (1912).
2Okla. Press Pub. Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186 (1946); U.S. v. Morton Salt Co., supra
note 17.
It is difficult to imagine how an "invoice" (Boyd case) would be anymore private than
copies of letters and telegrams (Wilson case).
2, Okla. Press Pub. Co. v. Walling, supra note 22.
Id. at 206.




ing the public interest against private security." 28 In holding in favor of the
public interest, the Court cited the dissenting opinion of Justice Cardozo in
Jones v. Securities and Exchange Commission.
2 9
In that opinion Justice Cardozo made it very clear that the Securities and
Exchange Commission "is without coercive powers, cannot arrest or amerce or
imprison though a crime has been uncovered .... ,,30
Justice Murphy, dissenting in the Okla. Press Pub. Co. case presented the
case for private security as follows:
Excessive use or abuse of authority cannot only destroy man's instinct for liberty
but will eventually undo the administrative processes themselves. Our history is
not without a precedent of a successful revolt against a ruler who sent hither
swarms of officers to harass our people.
3'
The Antitrust Civil Process Act poses the problem of public interest versus
private security. Its avowed purpose is to arm the Attorney General with an
extra-judicial power to obtain evidence of past antitrust violations, whether
civil or criminal.3 2 It would not have been unprecendented if Congress had
limited the Attorney General's power under the Act to civil prosecutions.
The Attorney General has for some time waived his right to institute crimi-
nal proceedings for antitrust violations in the so-called "railroad release" pro-
cedures.
33
Under this procedure, the Attorney General reviews industrial plans or pro-
grams to determine whether or not they violate the antitrust laws. He waives
his right to bring criminal proceedings if the corporation cooperates fully, but
reserves the right to bring a civil action to challenge the legality of the plan.
This procedure seems fair and equitable. The corporation is given immunity
from criminal prosecution for its cooperation in furnishing the Attorney Gen-
eral with necessary information.
If this type of immunity provision had been included within the Act, the
demand would be within the purview of the Okla. Press Pub. Co. case and
would undoubtedly be considered constitutonal by the courts. However, this
is not the case.
Judge Nordby, in his opinion in the Gold Bond Stamp Company case, was
apparently misled by the term "civil investigative demand." He did not men-
21 Okla. Press Pub. Co. v. Walling, supra note 22 at 203.
-291 U.S. 1 (1934).
Old. at 33.
11 Okla. Press Pub. Co. v. Walling, supra note 22, at 218. See Olmstead v. U.S., 277 U.S. 438,
478-79 (1928), Brandeis, J. dissenting.
a' H.R. Rep. No. 1386, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 3-4 (1962). Hearings on S. 167 Before the Sub-
committee on Antitrust and Monopoly of the Committee on the Judiciary, 87th Cong., 1st
Sess. 15 (1961).
8 BARNES, Assistant Attorney General, Theory and Practice of Antitrust Administration in
How to Comply with the Antitrust Laws, Commerce Clearing House (1954).
1964]
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tion the fact that the potential violations on which the demand was based
were of both a criminal and a civil nature.3 4 He supported his holding on the
rulings in the Okla. Press Pub. Co. case and the Morton Salt Company case.
Both of these cases involved civil prosecutions by administrative agencies. In
each case the court was careful to distinguish the Boyd case, relegating it to
cases involving criminal proceedings.
The alarming aspect of the civil investigative demand is the fact that the
Attorney General can compel a citizen of the United States to furnish docu-
mentary materials which may be used as evidence in a criminal prosecution.
This investigative "short-cut," authorized by Congress for the sake of expe-
diency, is a flagrant violation of the individual's personal security guaranteed
by the Constitution.
It is submitted that this compulsory production of documentary materials
which may be used in a criminal prosecution falls within the condemnation
of the Boyd case as an "unreasonable search and seizure" under the Fourth
Amendment.
The Court of Appeals of the Eighth Circuit will have the opportunity to
review the decision of the District Court in the Gold Bond Stamp Company
case.35 Will the court permit further encroachments on private security in the
name of public interest?
Obsta principiis-withstand beginnings-was the warning given by Justice
Bradley in the Boyd case against the Government's attempt to encroach upon a
citizen's constitutional privileges. The warning is repeated here.
THOMAS A. ROTHWELL, JR.
See note 7, supra.
Presently the case is on appeal to the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals
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